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The American Law School Review.

The Nature of Law.
By HUGH E VANDER WILLIS.
Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.

T

for student
consideration
great colHE
of law two
has before
him
lections of contending, conflicting phenomena-one representing the
rights of the individual, individual initiative, the power of the separate wills
of the myriads of human beings in
the world; the other, the rights of
society, social restraint, the power of
law in its early forms and as administered in the law courts of to-day.
In other words, he is busied over the
problem of liberty, of striking the proper balance between the individual and
his fellow men; for true liberty consists
in the absolute freedom to do as one
chooses so long as he does not interfere
with the rights of other men or of nature. The individual is in constant activity, constantly in motion, constantly
claiming more than his share of the advantages and privileges of nature, constantly invading the domains of the capabilities of others. He not only claims
the rights of life, liberty, reputation,
property, marriage, parentage, livelihood,
all political, industrial, educational and
religious rights for himself, but, what is
vital to this discussion, he neglects to
recognize these rights in other men.
References: Andrews' American Law, 86. 105,
125, 152; Bigelow's Centralization and the
Law; Holland's Jurisprudence, 39-40, 5272. 73-75. 82-84; Holmes' Common Law; Kinkead's Jurisprudence, etc.,
187-188, 295;
Maine's Ancient Law, Early History of Institutions, 23. 233-235, 303. 371-400, Early Law
and Custom, 160-191, 192-228; Pollock's Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics, 1; Robinson's
Elements of American Jurisprudence, 124; Wilson's Works, I. 55-56, II. 300; The Oldest
Code in the World (Hammurabi); the Pentateuch; The Statutes of the Various States.

Had men always lived according to and
obeyed the moral law of their own constitution, had they always listened to the
voice of conscience and been restrained
by its sanctions, there might never have
been any need for human laws; but,
more than now, in primitive days, conscience spoke to the race in a voice so
low, or the ears of primal barbarous man
were so dull of hearing, that the moral
law had very little control over him.
Hence the problem: How should the
majority, or dominant power, keep men
from interfering with the rights of their
fellow men? The manner in which society has attempted to accomplish this
has been by enacting human law with
penalties more *severe than those of the
moral law seemed to be.
What, then, is our question, has been
the essential characteristic of this manenacted law? In its real nature, is it
positive or negative? Does it command
man to do some things, or forbid his doing some things? Does it tell man what
he must do, or what he must not do? Is
its purpose to make men do right, or to
prevent their doing wrong? Does it give
men rights, or protect their rights? Is
it creative, energizing, inspiring, or destructive, restraining, controlling? Does
it tell men to be perfect, or simply punish certain of the worst imperfections?
Does it give man freedom, or limit the
exercise of his freedom?
At first it may be thought that such a
question is not practical, but, even though
it does not concern the every-day mat-
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ters of the law, it does concern so fundamental a conception of the entire body
of the law that I think no one would deny
its importance. A sure and logical understanding of the primary and underlying
principles of the whole of any subject is
the best way to acquire a mastery of that
subject; and such knowledge, though
not used in any particular part, or application, of it, will yet so shine through
and illuminate the parts that the possessor will often exhibit a skill and strength
that otherwise would be impossible.
For an answer to this general question
we are not limited to abstract reasoning,
but there is a wealth of historical material at hand. We are able to go back to
almost the beginnings of human law and
trace its development step by step, discovering its real nature at each step,
from the time when it first began to be
formulated in rude simplicity down to the
present with its multifarious and complicated variations, unfortunately not lying in one great system even in the common-law countries, but scattered through
the common law, constitutions, statutes
and ordinances in the wierdest confusion.
The earliest laws discoverable among
the different lawmaking nations of the
world all seem to have a tort aspect.
Laws always seem to follow natural
lines, and we see laws gradually coming
in to take the place of individual violence. The first attempt to restrain and
limit the conduct of others was purely
individual, and was due to the fact that
each person felt that he had a right to
life, health, reputation, property (at least
for his family), livelihood and the marriage relation. While men felt that they
were entitled to all of these rights, they
did not realize that their fellow men were
entitled to the same rights, but instead
did anything that they had the physical
strength to do. The principles of the

moral law exerted little control. As a
consequence the peace and safety of society became exceedingly unstable. Murders were common. Robberies, assaults,
batteries and the many acts threatening
the marriage relation-than which nothing could more intensely inflame the
passions of men-made society dangerous. No man could be sure of his life,
property, or other rights unless he was
able to secure them by the strength of
his own right arm, or the assistance of
his kindred. In such a state of society
the first laws began to take shape. Perhaps the earliest laws were only the consensus of opinion as to what a man ought
to be allowed to do to redress his own
wrongs. This soon took the form of
authorized vengeance. Successive executions of this public opinion finally
crystalized into precedents. Precedents
were altered, added to, and preserved
in written ordinances, statutes and constitutions, the number and character of
these varying as the dominant element
in society changed from the patriarch,
to the aristocracy, and finally to the
democratic' majority. But for a long
period of time, whether the individual
had to look to himself or to the community for the redress and protection
of his rights, the only prohibitions
against acts were those against torts.
The laws seem to have been penal, but
the penal law of ancient communities
was not a true law of crimes-a punishment of public wrongs-but a law of
torts, the dominant power (or State)
being merely the arbiter. So that, if
the criterion of a crime be that the State
and not the person is the one suffering
from the wrong, in the beginnings of
the law crimes were unknown; the stability and security of society, the adjustment of the rights of men, freedom, depended upon the prevention of private
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wrongs rather than upon the prevention
of wrongs against the State considered
as an entity. The idea of a separate offense against the State, or aggregate
community, was not conceived of until
the State had redressed, or prevented,
private wrongs so long that it came to
consider that it had rights somewhat
analogous to the individual man.
All of these laws of torts, not only in
the beginning, but even to-day, are negative in character. Men are not told what
they must do but what they must not do.
In general men have been allowed to do
anything that they wanted to do, to be
absolute judges of whether they should
or should not do a certain thing. It has
been only when they attempted to violate certain rights of others that they
have felt the restraining power of the
dominant element in society acting for
society as a whole for the purpose of
controlling the conduct of the offender
for the protection and benefit of the
many. The possibilities of human action and the difficulties in the way of
controlling it were too great for society
to leave the task to individual defense,
or for society to attempt anything but
the minimum of regulation. Hence it
said nothing about the great mass of
humnan acts, but concerning a few which
it considered the most heinous it said
"thou shalt not," and punished the disregard of the command, at first, with the
most severe punishments,
generally
death in one way or another. Even
these prohibitions were generally found
only in the punishments prescribed.
Modern punishments are less severe because of the fact that the law of torts has
split up into crimes and torts, and the
former has taken all the severe penalties
of the early law, and the latter is confined to damages, the progenv of the
primitive surrender of the offending

thing and the buying off of the avenger.
Men are told: "Thou shalt not" assault thy neighbor, nor falsely imprison
him, nor maliciously prosecute him, nor
slander or libel him, nor trespass upon
his property, nor commit waste of his
property, nor convert it, nor erect a
nuisance, nor, under certain circumstances, be guilty of negligence; but nowhere is there a catalogue of the things
they must do.
It is true that many of these laws, instead of following the moral law, have
been the clearest perversions of it, but
those who have enacted them have apparently had their ideals, although they
have seen darkly, and great as has been
the suffering caused by cruel and unjust
laws they have been as nothing to what
they would have been had not legislators
confined their laws to prohibitions. This
thought is well expressed and sumnmarized in the words of Justice Wilson: "In
a state of natural liberty, every one is
allowed to act according to his own inclination, provided he transgress not
those limits which are assignea to him
by the law of nature; in a state of civil
liberty, he is allowed to act according to
his inclination, provided he transgress
not those limits which are assigned to
him by the municipal law. True it is,
that, by the municipal law, some things
may be prohibited which are not prohibited by the law of nature; but equally true it is, that, under a government
which is wise and good, every citizen
will gain more liberty than he can lose
by these prohibitions. He will gain
more by the limitation of other men's
freedom than he can lose by the diminution of his own. He will gain more by
the enlarged and undisturbed exercise
of his natural liberty in innumerable instances than he can lose by the restriction of it in a few."
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This is the manner in which humanity
has found the equilibrium between the
rights of the individual and his fellow
men so far as those private rights which
fall within the realm of torts are concerned. We will now trace the history
of crimes and contracts in order to discover the method employed in those
realms. We have seen how the law of
torts has kept in touch with the natural
instincts of men and how by building up
one prohibition after another the present
extent of the law of torts was finally
reached. The work on criminal law and
the law of contracts was not begun until
a later time, and it has been only after
long years of toil that they have been
brought to their present state, of perfection or imperfection.
The early law of torts was civil but
with a criminal aspect; it satisfied the
private party and at the same time afforded protection to the community, and
now and always the general principles
of criminal and civil liberty are the same.
In the separation of the law of crimes
from the law of torts the indictment has
taken the place of the appeal; the presentment is the successor of fresh pursuit
and lynch law. Ignorance of the law
(the rights of others) is no excuse for the
individual because he has to be sacrificed for the general good. Little by
little society began to feel that it had
rights to be safeguarded, and as this idea
grew stronger and became localized they
passed from the realm of private into
the realm of public law. One by one
laws have been built up to restrain the
conduct of men so far as various public
matters are concerned, and these constitute our criminal law. Yet, here again the
object of criminal laws has not been to
force men to do certain specific things,
not to shape and mold their lives-they
have been left free; but to restrain them

from invading the coequal rights of
others. Consequently these laws have
been in the nature of prohibitions. They
have set limits to the movements of human wills. They have been banks to the
current of human will power. There are
some acts so dangerous to society in general that the latter cannot permit them to
be done. Such are homicides, mayhems,
assaults and batteries, robberies, libels.
rape, seduction, abortion, adultery, arson, burglary, forgery, larceny (all
crimes against some person), and there
are also some acts which are crimes
against the government itself, which is
organized for the purpose of preventing
the first named wrongs. For the commission of any of these crimes the law
punishes the criminal with severe punishments, varying in severity with the
crime. But here the punishments stop.
Men are not fined and imprisoned for
neglecting to do positive acts commanded. for the law, with a few modern exceptions, does not utter any such commands.
In the same way (although because
of the greater artificiality and formality
of contracts the principle is not so easily
seen), by reason of the fact that the
breaches of agreements are often not
only, exasperating but disastrous and the
moral law seems too weak to prevent
them, little by little men have extended
the. wall of prohibition from the region
of torts along a part of the domain of
agreements. The beginnings of this
work are found in the early customs that
grew out of the demands and necessities
of the business world. At first the only
breaches of agreements punished were
those of the most simple "real" contracts
and other unilateral contracts, including
formal conveyances, but the punishment has been extended to the breach of
the consensual contract. Nothing posi-
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tive has been commanded. Only a small
part of the territory of agreements even
has been touched, most agreements being
controlled only by the moral law. And,
in order to be a contract, whose breach is
forbidden by human law, at first the
agreement had to rest upon a duty imposed by law because of delivery of property or the most ceremonious fornialities; and at the present time it must be a
complete offer and acceptance, rest upon
a valuable (?) consideration, or be under
seal, in- certain cases be in the proper
written form, and be free from fraud,
duress, undue influence, mistake, immorality, or other vitiating circumstanceall of which shows the relationship of
contracts to torts and the moral law. If
an agreement possesses all of these prerequisites, that is, is a valid contract, if
a person breaks it, in addition to the
penalties of the moral law, he must pay
the penalty prescribed by the majority
in the State, as the punishment for the
wrong to the individual with whom he
has been dealing-for not keeping within
the wall of limitation established; which
punishment, as in the case of torts, is
generally the payment of damages to the
party wronged. , This is the minimum of
regulation for society to exercise, and
not to exercise this would lead into society the same evils that existed in the
region of torts before lnvT sterr)ed in and
took the weapon of vengeance out of the
hand of private persons. Even now, the
law does not order men to make these
valid contracts, but, having made them,
the law forbids their breaking them
on penalty of payment of damages
for such breach, or, in quasi contracts,
forbids one person to unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another.
This method of development and this
nature of the law seem to be characteristic of all the nations that have generat-

ed systems of laws of their own, including the Babylonian, Hebrew, Greek, Roman and English. The Hebrew system
may be considered typical. This system, which modern scholars have discovered is the result of a slow growth,
was first adapted to nomadic life, then
to agricultural, and last to commercial.
The earliest laws are only one step removed from the code of private vengeance; they begin with authorized vengeance. Animate and inanimate things
are punished alike for injuries received.
Progress continues until the laws are
executed by properly constituted magistrates. But these penalties are to be inflicted, not for failure to do something
commanded, but, except in the case of a
few religious matters and in their late
history public matters, only for doing
something which their Mosaic code had
solemnly forbidden. The thought underlying their legal system seems to have
been that there are certain acts which
human beings are liable to commit,
which are so dangerous, or destructive,
or demoralizing, that they should be prohibited; and, therefore, its commands,
whether thundering forth from Sinai or
issuing from the quiet retreats of prophets and priests in their hiding places in
the land of Palestine, all seem to have
as their fundamental principle this negative idea. They are "thou shalt nots."
There are a few things that must not be
done. The Hebrews are told that they
must not worship idols and heathen gods,
desecrate the Sabbath, kill, steal, commit
adultery, or an assault, or incest, etc., on
pain of the severest punishments.
This exposition might be carried farther so as to embrace the working of the
principle in all the subdivisions of the
law, by showing how infants, insane, corporations and other persons, natural and

The American Law School Review.
artificial, have greater restrictions placed
upon them than the average person, and
by showing how the principle underlies
the subjects of wills, property, all contract subjects, almost all the subjects
known to the law and the statutes passed
by legislative bodies; but I think enough
has been said to show that the real nature of human law is negative and not
positive. Of course there are some laws
positive in character, but these have to
do with administrative and remedial matters, are a late development, form only
a small part of the body of the law, and
all of them appear to exist for the purpose

of enforcing those primary laws which
are negative in character and in which we
must expect to find the true nature of
law. However, because of this fact, some
legal writers, notably Mr. Holland, have
insisted that, in nature, law is not merely
negative but imposes positive obligations;
but it seems to me their position is not
correct historically in that it does not
show the real nature of law in the past
and so far as it has yet developed, and
Mr. Pollock's remark that Mr. Holland
has unduly emphasized the right of the
individual over his duty to others, or the
rights of others, is a just criticism.

Practice Work in the Law Colleges.
By PHILIP T. VAN ZILE,
Dean Detroit Gollcge of Law.

M

Y article,
only excuse
producingmust
this
whichfornecessarily
be more or less personal, if excuse should be made, is that it is the result of compliance with a request of the
editor of the "Review" that I should
give to the public the work of "The
School of Practice" under my supervision in the "Detroit College of Law."
My consent to do so, however, was
given upon the condition that I might
notice some of the current criticisms of
Law School work generally indulged
in by some of the several Law Associations.
It has, indeed, been interesting to
note the growing interest of the bar for
the last ten years in the work of the
Law Colleges, and particularly the interest shown in the last five or six years
by the Bar Associations of the country.

I note the time of this developing interest, because prior to ten, or possibly fifteen, years ago there was no
apparent interest exhibited by the bar
or the Bar Associations on this subject. Fifteen years ago, and in portions
of the country very much less, the young
lawyer was largely the product of the
law office, getting his knowledge of the
law in a sort of catch as catch can way,
without any especial attention from his
so-called preceptor, except now and
then, when called upon to hunt up a
witness or copy and serve a pleading, or,
in some country offices, to sweep out
the office and build the fires; the
greater portion of the time of the student in the office being taken up in perusing some law book undirected and alone,
and after a year or so of such like work
the student applied to the Court for ad-

